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Palmigiano: The Constitutionality of Prison Mail
Censorship

In Palmigiano v. Travisono' the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island examined the practice of prison mail censorship in light of
the first and fourth amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom
from unlawful search and seizure. In a class suit, inmates of the Rhode Island
Adult Correctional Institution sought an order restraining prison authorities
from "delaying, opening, reading, censoring or tampering in any way with
incoming or outgoing mail," 2 Rejecting prior case law 3 the district court
granted a temporary restraining order and reasoned that total censorship served
"no rational deterrent, rehabilitative or prison security purpose." 4 It ruled that
total censorship of outgoing mail was "unnecessary and in violation of the
First Amendment rights of the parties involved," 5 and formulated a rule of
reason for incoming mail which was dictated by prison security. The court also
held that either type of mail cannot be constitutionally censored if it is between
pretrial inmates and their attorneys6 or certain public officials.'
As the court in Palmigiano recognized, any discussion of prison inmates'
I. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
2. Id. at 780.
3. Prior to Palmigianothe settled doctrine was that "except in extreme cases the courts will
not interfere with the conduct of a prison, with the enforcement of its rules and regulations, or
its discipline." Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1963); see, e.g., Harris v. Settle,
322 F.2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209
F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1953). Since censorship of inmate mail Was not considered an "extreme
case," judicial review was limited. Courts felt they possessed neither the time nor expertise to
supervise the minute details of prison administration and were unwilling to review the acts of prison
authorities except in circumstances of illegal detainment or cruel and unusual punishment. See,
e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th
Cir. 1964).
.4. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. at 785.
5. Id. at 791.
6. Id. at 789.
7. The court held that prison officials were prohibited from opening or otherwise inspecting
the contents of any incoming or outgoing letters between inmates and the following public officials:
a) The President of the United States; any United States Senator or Congressman;
Judges of any of the Federal Courts of the United States; including the clerks of said
courts, the Attorney General of the United States and Director of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons.
b) The Governor of the State of Rhode Island, Supreme, Superior and District Court
Judges of Rhode Island; Lt. Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, General
Treasurer, and any member of the Rhode Island State Legislature or any state prison
official or member of the Parole Board.
Id. at 788-89.
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constitutional rights must begin with an analysis of the "retention of rights"
doctrine. This doctrine, originally propounded in Coffin v. Reichard, 8 states
that "a prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly or by necessary implication taken from him by law." 9 In contrast
to those "judicial attitudes of the past"" which considered the prison inmate
as a "slave of the state,"" Palmigiano recognized that prisoners do retain
certain first and fourth amendment rights.
The state's interest in maintaining the security of its penal institutions was
balanced against the "retention of rights" doctrine.12 Although it acknowledged
the legitimacy of the state interest, the Palmigiano court stressed the inmate's
right to rehabilitation and the integral role that the receipt of mail plays in
any effective rehabilitation program. The court felt that this right should be
weighted heavily whenever it is balanced against the state interest in the security
8. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
9. Id. at 445.
10. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. at 785.
I1. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
12. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. at 783. Prison authorities stress the importance
of screening incoming correspondence to prevent the introduction of contraband into the institution.
See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1961). Thus, incoming mail is generally
examined to detect evidence of escape plots or weapons, and to exclude so called "inflammatory
material" and drugs. In In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970),
the court upheld a prison regulation which prevented inmates' access "to obscene materials or
those which tend to incite certain activities which pose a distinct threat to prison discipline." Here,
an inmate challenge the constitutionality of the marijuana law and attempted to correspond with
a theology professor who had co-authored a work on the subject with Dr. Timothy Leary. See
also Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 36 (D.D.C. 1962), where a Negro inmate, a disciple of
Elijah Muhammad, was denied access to a newspaper which carried an article by his spiritual
leader since it was considered "inflammatory."
Censorship has also been imposed on an inmate's business correspondence. The purpose of this
was to prevent the prisoner from gaining outside resources which would be used as a lever in the
corruption of prison guards. See, e.g., Brabson v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693
(Sup. Ct. 1965); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
In Palmigiano, the Assistant Director for Correctional Services professed a fear that inmates
would engage in confidence schemes or enter into criminal conspiracies with persons outside the
prison. 317 F. Supp. at 784. He felt he had a statutory duty to censor outgoing mail in order to
"protect the outside community from insulting, obscene, or threatening letters." Id. at 784. As
a result, the censoring officer was given authority to "stop any letter that is insulting, fraudulent,
threatening or not in good taste or any letter that cases the prison in an unfavorable light." Id.
at 784. The courts have consistently upheld this type of broad delegation of censorship powers to
prison authorities as being valid incidents of state interest. See, e.g., McDonough v. Director of
Patuxent, 429 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1970), (although an inmate was allowed to publish a letter in
Playboy magazine seeking financial assistance, he had no right to criticize the penal administration
or the constitutionality of the law under which he was sentenced); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970
(8th Cir. 1965), (a prison regulation which prevented outgoing mail criticism of "the law, rules,
institution policy or officials" is an inherent incident in the administration of penal institutions);
McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964), (prison officials have a right to censor inmate
correspondence to be certain of its "reasonableness and propriety").
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of the institution.13
Although the petitioners in Palmigianoalleged first, fourth, sixth, ninth and
fourteenth amendment violations, the court limited its discussion to the first
amendment guarantees, except to note that fourth amendment abuses were also
inherent in the prison censorship procedure. This article will examine the first
amendment arguments advanced by, the Palmigiano court, propose an
alternative fourth amendment approach, and suggest ninth amendment
considerations.
First Amendment Considerations
In his examination of the constitutionality of prison mail censorship, Judge
Petine writing for the three judge statutory court adhered to the two controlling
doctrines of the Supreme Court-the clear and present danger test and the
balancing of interests test. As originally enunciated in Schenck v. United
States", the clear and present danger test states that an individual's action can
be restricted only if it is clear that failure to do so would substantially harm
the public welfare.1 This test was modified in Dennis v. United States6 in which
the Supreme Court weighed the need for restrictions on first amendment rights
against the consequences of permitting unrestrained actions. "In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger."' 7 Applying the Dennis test requires that prison mail censorship
be weighed against first amendment guarantees. As Palmigiano stated "the
burden is on the prison authorities to show a compelling justification for
13. In balancing these divergent state interests, the court recognized that noted criminologists
have espoused greater freedom rather than restriction of the inmate's communication with the
"outside world."
We argue for fewer restrictions on letter writing. Letter writing keeps the prisoner in
contact with the outside world, helps to hold in check some of the morbidity and
helplessness produced by prison life and isolation, stimulates his more natural and human
impulses, and otherwise may make contributions to better mental attitudes and
reformation.
Palmigiano v. Trevisono, 317 F. Supp. at 786. See also C. BARNES & J. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS
IN CRIMINOLOGY 492 (3d ed. 1959).
14. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
15. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-78 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring).
16. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
17. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). This quote by Chief Judge Learned
Hand was adopted by the Supreme Court on appeal. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510
(1950). There is some controversy as to whether the "clear and present danger" test was overruled
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) where the Court citing Dennis held that,
These later cases have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantee of free
speech and free press do not permit a state to "forbid or proscribe (the oral) advocacy
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interfering with the free exercise of those freedoms."'" Thus, the prisoner should
retain his rights unless suppression is justified by an overriding interest.19
Like Palmigiano, Jackson v. Godwin 2° found that prison officials had not
met the heavy burden of justifying their infringement upon an individual's
freedom. The Jackson court stated:
[ln the area of first amendment freedoms] we have pointed out that
stringent standards are to be applied to governmental restrictions
. . . and rigid scrutiny . . . must show some substantial and
controlling interest which requires the subordination or limitation
of these important constitutional rights, and which justifies their
infringement . . . and absence of such compelling justification, the
State restrictions are impermissible infringements of these
21
fundamental and preferred rights.
The court found that it was not enough to simply balance the state interest
against first amendment protections. Rather the state was required to use the
least restrictive methods possible in protecting itself. Judge Tuttle went on to
say:
Moreover, in examining the justification for state infringement in
the area of [first amendment freedoms] the Supreme Court has
recognized and declared the principle that the means utilized by the
State, as well as the ends, must be legitimate. Even the most
legitimate of legislative ends cannot justify the enforcement [sic] of
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447. Justices Black and Douglas concurred stating they understood that the majority opinion,
by simply citing Dennis, "did not indicate any agreement on the Court's part with the 'clear and
present danger' doctrine on which Dennis purports to rely." Id. at 450. Some circuits do not agree.
See Norton v. Discipline Committee, 419 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969). For a discussion of the
distortion of the "clear and present danger" test by Dennis, see McKay, The Preference for
Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182, 1203 (1959).
18. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. at 786.
19. Although the Courts in Palmigiano and in Coffin v. Reichard squarely faced the first
amendment issues, they did so only to the extent that it affected the receipt of mail by the prison
inmate. The infringement of these rights vis-a-vis the non-inmates who were corresponding with
the prisoners was not the basis of these decisions.
20. 400 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Id. at 541. A Negro inmate under sentence of death charged that prison officials had
deprived him of equal protection by denying him the right to receive Negro newspapers and
magazines. The prison regulation under which censorship of inmate mail was excercised gave
authority to the prison superintendent "to refuse mail if in his opinion such mail would be
detrimental to good order and discipline." Id. at 531. The prison superintendent felt justified in
excluding certain mail to the inmate, because it was his duty "to insure that no publications
containing elements of violence or sex entered the prison." Id. at 531. In addition, the prison
regulation limited the inmates' access to the rest of society by providing that a prisoner could
subscribe to one newspaper of his choice, but that choice was restricted to newspapers published
in the prisoner's home town. Id. at 530.
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fundamental rights if these ends may be accomplished by the use
of less restrictive alternative means which result in less invasion of
these fundamental rights. n
Curtailing a prisoner's first amendment right to receive mail may have a
deleterious effect on society as a whole as well as on an individual inmate.
Just as mail censorship limits the right of an inmate to receive information
from the outside world, it also curtails society's right to firsthand information
about prison conditions.21
A court must not focus solely on the first amendment rights of the prison
inmate. Rather it must concern itself also with the "rights of all persons or
institutions outside the prison who wish to correspond with the inmate.1 2 Ideas
expressed in prison correspondence represent one of the few means by which
society can keep abreast of the status and conditions of prisoners and prisons.
By limiting this means of expression, the courts permit prison authorities to
arbitrarily control the dissemination of thought between the prison community
and society as a whole. Such an arbitrary exercise of power is abhorrent to
the freedoms contained in the first amendment.
The necessity of allowing inmates to communicate with the courts has
previously provided an exception to the "hands-off" doctrine and resulting
reluctance of courts to interfere with the administration of prisons. As
Palmigiano acknowledged, the judiciary has been quick to intervene in the
administration of a prison when called upon to safeguard access to the courts
themselves.2 Not only are prison officials restrained from restricting inmate
correspondence with the courts, they are also prohibited from unreasonably
delaying this mail, "since such delay would amount to an effective denial of
26
a prisoner's right to access to the courts.
22. Id. at 541.
23. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), the Supreme Court stated that free speech is
guaranteed every citizen so that he may reach the mind of willing listeners, and in order to do so
"there must be an opportunity to win their attention." Id. at 87.
24. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. at 786. It would follow that in any examination
of the constitutionality of prison mail censorship, consideration also must be given to the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. The Supreme Court stated in Ex Parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877):
Regulations cannot be enforced against the transportation of printed matter in the mail,
which is open to examination, or as to interfere in any manner with the freedom of
the press. Liberty of circulating is an essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing;
indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.
25. It is well settled that "access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their
complaints may not be denied or obstructed." Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Lee
v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959).
26. See, e.g., Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970
(8th Cir. 1965); Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959); United States ex rel Vraniak
v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Ill. 1958);Warfield v. Raymond, 195 Md. 711, 71 A.2d
870 (1950); Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 21:215

Prior to Palmigiano, the courts had not been eager to interfere with the
censorship of correspondence between an inmate and his attorney. 7 Palmigiano
held that inmate-attorney mail is an extension of an inmate's right of access
to the courts. 8 Rather than relying on the common-law attorney-client privilege
the court reasoned that since an attorney is an officer of the court, such
correspondence amounts to intimate correspondence with the courts, and is thus
entitled to constitutional protection.2 9 The court considered the censorship of
attorney-inmate mail to be "just another veil which can help hide an
30
administration which perhaps should be a prime subject for judicial review.
It is axiomatic that an inmate needs to consult with his attorney and that
an unconvicted inmate, innocent until proven otherwise, possesses both the need
and the right to consult freely with his legal representative. Palmigiano
recognized the need and protected the right.
Fourth Amendment Considerations
The court in Palmigiano focused primarily on mail censorship as it relates to
the first amendment. However, it also held that the conduct of prison officials
who indiscriminately opened and read prison mail "whether the same be from
inmates or members of the free society" was a violation of the fourth
amendment; 31 yet it recognized that "by necessity, the full sweep of the fourth
27. One of the reasons for this is set out by Eugene N. Barkin, Legal Counsel, Federal Bureau
of Prisons and Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University:
Unfortunately, a small minority of the members of the bar are not above reproach,
but perhaps more important is that it is a simple matter for anyone to have a fictitious
return address printed on envelopes and letterheads.
Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted,
45 NEB. L. REv. 669, 675 (1966).
28. In reasoning thusly, the Palmigiano court fully agreed with Judge Keating's dissent in
Brabson v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 modified 267 N.Y.S. 2d 580 (1966),
where it was stated that ". . . the right of a prisoner to unexpurgated communications with his
attorney is so significant that it outweights the danger of frustration of prison rules regarding
outside activities ....
" Id. at 699.
29. To censor such correspondence, Palmigiano held, would be "to render ineffective the
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment." In so doing the court rejected the rationale of United States
ex rel Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (D. Me. 1953); Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553
(E.D. II1., 1852).
30. 317 F. Supp. at 789. The Federal Bureau of Prisons does not subject an attorney's visits
with his client-inmate to auditory supervision, yet they do censor attorney correspondence. "The
obvious question, therefore is whether an escape plan or illegal business dealing can be transmitted
as effectively by word of mouth as by the pen." If this is true then the practical benefits achied
by the inspection of attorney-inmate correspondence are illusory.
Since uncensored visits are permitted between attorneys and inmates it follows logically that
inmate-attorney correspondence should be free from censorship. In addition, any danger resulting
from the rare case of an attorney assisting an inmate to avoid a legitimate prison regulation would
be significantly outweighed by the constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
31. 317 F. Supp. at 791.
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amendment obviously cannot apply in a prison or jail context.13 2 Therefore,
although the court recognized that the inmate retained his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, it failed to define the scope of such
protection.3
It is a general rule that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area
without a search warrant is presumptively unreasonable.3 First class mail is
such a constitutionally protected area;15 thus the mail may not be opened
without the authority of a search warrant. When the articles searched are a
form of expression, such as letters, the protection of the fourth amendment is
supported by the inherent freedoms of the first amendment, and therefore, the
courts have been extremely reluctant to class a search as reasonable when its
ultimate goal is the suppression of free speech or thought.3
To qualify for fourth amendment protection a case must meet two
qualifications: first, the person searched must have had an actual expectation
of privacy; and second, that expectation must have been one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. 37 In Palmigiano, the prison authorities
sought to negate the first qualification, of the prisoner's expectation of
uncensored mail, by requiring inmates to sign an authorization of censorship. 3
This waiver, when judged by generally applicable standards is a travisty.3 9 A
32. Id.
33. The Palmigiano Court held that such a fourth amendment right must be subject "to such
curtailment as may be made necessary by the purpose of confinement and the requirements of
security." Id. at 791.
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967), (Harlan, J., concurring) "The overriding
function of the fourth amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by the state." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). Its adoption was a
reaction to the misuse of power in searches and seizures. The assurances against its revival are
so deeply embodied in the fundamental law that "it ought not to be impaired by judicial sanction
of equivocal methods, which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality,
but which, in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right." Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
35. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 414 F.2d 758 (9th
Cir. 1969); For the constitutional distinction made between first class mail and other classes of
mail, Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957). Whether such a rule is now applicable
in a prison context is a matter of conjecture. In 1919, the Supreme Court held that letters written
by an inmate charged with the murder of a prison guard may be intercepted by a vison warden
without a warrant, conveyed to a prosecutor and later used as evidence against the inmate in a
criminal trial without violating the fourth amendment. See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15
(1919).
36. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). The principal reason why
such logic has not been applied to prixon mail is the "hands-off" policy argument.
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. 317 F. Supp. at 781. The waiver was not mandatory, but unless it was signed the prisoner
lost all mail privileges.
39. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319
(5th Cir. 1963); McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1962); Channel v. United
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search may be conducted with consent and without a warrant only if the
individual freely and intelligently gives an "unequivocal and specific consent"
which is "uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, actual or implied." 4
Courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against such waiver and will
not presume aquiessence in the loss of fundamental rights.' Prison regulations
such as that in Palmigiano not only coerce an inmate to surrender his already
limited constitutimal rights, but, if exercised in the extreme, approach
42
administrative extortion.
Since the usual justification for censoring prisoner mail is the maintenance
of the security necessary to effectively administer correctional institution, it
would be better to interpret the fourth amendment in light of the rationale
proferred for "administrative searches." Although Palmigianodid not consider
this approach, the similarities between an administrative search and the typical
prison censorship procedure are quite evident. Both are essentially noncriminal
searches, i.e., the authorities' primary intention is something other than
discovery of evidence for use in a criminal proceeding.4 3 The object of both
prison and administrative searches is the protection the public interest through
maintenance of an orderly society, whether prison society or society in general.
In either case, inspections are necessary and the rights of the public must be
balanced against the privacy of the individual. 44 In view of this similarity it is
difficult to justify any difference between the fourth amendment treatment of
administrative searches and of prison searches.
An issue similar to that in Palmigianowas presented to the Supreme Court
5
in Frank v. Maryland.4
There, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
Appellant's resistance can only be based, not on admissible selfStates, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United
States v. Kelih, 272 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Ill. 1951).
40. McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1960).
41. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See also United States v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703
(4th Cir. 1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81
(9th Cir. 1962).
42. The motive underlying the "authorization" is unclear. If the prison warden can rightfully
censor the prisoner's mail, why must the inmates sign the waiver? In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1937) and Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (Ist Cir. 1967) the standard of "consent"
was the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."
43. Both Justice Frankfurter in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) and Justice White in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) appeared
reluctant to use the term "civil search" because evidence found in an administrative search could
be used in a criminal charge. Such a proposition also holds true for prison mail censorship.
44. The difference between incoming and outgoing mail involves a constitutional question.
Incoming mail is authored by a nonprisoner yet is subject to the same censoring procedure as
outgoing mail. Although the court in Palmigiano made such a distinction in its restraining order,
it based its decision on grounds of prison maintainance rather than on the Constitution.
45. 359 U.S. 360 (1959), (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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protection (since the search is non-criminal in nature), but on a
rarely voiced denial of any official justification for seeking to enter
his home. The constitutional liberty that is asserted is the absolute
right to refuse consent for an inspection designed and pursued solely
for the protection of the community's health, even when the
inspection is conducted with due regard for every convenience of
time and place."
In Frank the Court held this absolute right was subordinate to state interest,
but Camara v. Municipal Court 7 overruled both the Frank reasoning and its
result. When it decided Frank the Court felt that administrative searches were
outside the protection of the fourth amendment because they lacked any
prospect of criminal prosecution.48 However, this reasoning was rejected in
Camara when the Court held that innocent persons should enjoy the same
safeguards as those suspected of criminal activity."'
Prior to Camara courts generally held that the broad restraints on
constitutional rights compel inquiry into both the extent of individual
suppression and the justification of social need which requires this suppression."
The need to search must be balanced against the invasion which the search
entails. 51 Camara enlarged this concept:
The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative
searches is that the public interest demands such a rule; . . . . Of
course in applying any reasonableness standard, including one of
constitutional dimensions, an argument that the public interest
demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But
we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at
this stage at least, whether these inspections may be made, but
whether they may be made without a warrant . . . In assessing
whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is
not whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question,
but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a
46. Id. at 366. Obviously, this issue changes considerably when the inspection is one which
continues daily as it does for the prison inmates.
47. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
48. On the difference between a "criminal" 'and a "civil" search, compare Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion with Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
49. For a more thorough discussion of the distinction between Frank and Camara and the
reliance upon Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials, Col. 1029 (1765), see Comment,
Administration Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 36 UMKC L. Rav. It1, 126 (1968).
50. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
51. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), (Clarke, Harlan & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting).
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warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search.52
The Court concluded that it was possible for fire, health, and housing code
inspection programs to achieve their goals within the confines of a warrant
requirement. However, the strict standards of a general warrant were relaxed
in an administrative search.0 The prerequisites for issuance of such a warrant
are satisfied upon showing that the prescribed legislative and administrative
standards have been met."
The reasoning in Camara would appear applicable to prison censorship
practice. Maintenance and discipline are maintained through periodic checks
of incoming mail. At the same time individual rights of personal liberty and
freedom of expression are not forfeited completely and the strict standards of
"probable cause" normally needed to obtain a fourth amendment search
warrant are unnecessary.
In some ways this middle-of-the-road solution to the prison censorship
problem is more constitutionally acceptable than the administrative guidelines
set down in Palmigiano," which placed a heavy emphasis on the state interest
in incoming and outgoing mail. All outgoing mail was found to be protected
by the fourth amendment and could not be the subject of a warrantless search.
However, because a satisfactory state interest was shown, substantially all
incoming mail was subjected to inspection." This reasoning runs contrary to
Camara's expansion of the fourth amendment protections. In Camara the
question was not whether the public interest justifies such a search, but whether
the authority to search should require a warrant. This depends partly on
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search. 57
Thus, in light of Camara, the real question for the Palmigiano court was
52.
53.

Id. at 533.
For the possible public policy effect of issuing such warrants, see Justice Clarke's dissenting

opinion in Camara. Other examples of what some call "wattered-down" warrants are found in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721 (1969); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968).
54. This standard might be satisfied if the administrative agency has deemed periodic inspection
essential. See Comment, supra note 48 at I 1l.
The Court reasoned that probable cause to issue
a warrant must exist if these standards are met.
55. Palmigiano v. Trovisono, 317 F. Supp. at 788. A middle-of-the-road approach would buy
any solution which centered between the two extremes of complete censorship and no censorship.
56. Id. at 790. The purpose of the warrantless inspection was the detection of inflammatory
and pornographic material, The exceptions were letters received from persons on the "approved
mailing list." Id. at 791.
57. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
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not whether a valid state interest exists in censoring incoming mail, but whether
obtaining a warrant would hamper the censorship procedure sufficiently to
harm the state interest. Since strict adherence to ordinary probable cause
requirements is unnecessary to obtain a warrant for an administrative search,
the state interest, although a factor, seems no longer decisive.
The administrative search rationale would afford greater protection to the
individual with whom the inmate corresponds than the censorship procedures
promulgated in Palmigiano. In addition, periodic inspection under authority
of a warrant would protect the rights of the non-inmate, while upholding the
valid interests of the prison authorities.
Ninth Amendment Considerations
The power to control evil does not remove all restrictions on the means
employed for that purpose.5" In Griswold v. Connecticut" the Supreme Court
stated that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities . . . may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms." 60 The rationale behind this protection is simply
that these liberties are so deeply rooted in the American tradition and
conscience as to be considered rundamental.11
Although Palmigiano did not utilize the ninth amendment to bolster its
reasoning, the argument is certainly applicable in the prison context. As with
fourth amendment considerations, the right to privacy is constitutionally
protected if no compelling state interest is present or if the procedure used to
secure the public interest is not reasonable. 62 Used as a rule of construction
to interpret the rights specified in the Constitution within the context of present
day needs and values, the ninth amendment compels inquiry into the availability
of alternative approaches to achieve the state interest.63 The Supreme Court
has stated: "It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas. This freedom of speech and press . . .
necessarily protects the right to receive . . . information and ideas, regardless
of their social worth [and] is fundamental to our free society. '64 This
58. Cross v. Harris, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 259 (1969).
59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), (Goldberg, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 485. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965), (Goldberg, J., concurring), quoting
with approval, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
62. See Comment, Connecticut Contraceptive Ban v. Right of Privacy, 34 UMKC L. REV.

95, 109 (1966).
63. Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment. 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121, 135 (1967). See Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) which involved alleged "obscene material."
64. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See also Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 307, 308 (1965); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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interpretation supports the prisoner's argument that not only is the writing and
sending of letters constitutionally protected, but also that the right to receive
mail is so fundamental as to be within the purview of the ninth amendment.
As stated in Griswold, the "various [constitutional] guarantees create zones
of privacy." 6 5 It is logical to assume that the right to send and receive
uncensored mail falls "within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees."" The ninth amendment expands the
freedoms inherent in the first amendment and brings them to their logical
conclusion 7 harboring those "additional fundamental rights which exist
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments."' 8 This reasoning was first espoused by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in Olmstead v. United States:
[The Farmers] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred as
against the Government, the right to be left alone, the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized
men. 0
This right of privacy, the claim of individuals to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others, 7 is more than a penumbra right "formed by emanations from those
[first and fourth amendment] guarantees that help give them life and
substance."7 " It is a basic right in itself, existing alongside other protected
activity. Not surprisingly, this right of privacy in communication has been
suggested as the underlying theme of the Bill of Rights.73 In arguing to limit
such a right, the state bears a substantial burden of justification. It must not
only further a substantial governmental interest, but it must also avoid the
suppression of free expression as much as possible. Furthermore, "the
incidental restrictions on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no
74
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.1
65.

381 U.S. 484.

66.

Id.
at 485.

67. The same reasoning might be used to find double protection (for the sender and
against unreasonable search and seizure in the fourth amendment.
68. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), (Goldberg, J. cdncurring).
69. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
70. Id. at 442.
71. J. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). This definition of privacy was used
Griswold reasoning in Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970).
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), (Goldberg, J., concurring).
73. Note, Griswold, The Right to be Left Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960).
Comment, Privacy after Griswold: Constitutional or Natural Law Right?, 60 Nw. U.L.
(1966).
74. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), (Harlan, J.,concurring).
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in O'Brien.

receiver)

with the

See also
REV. 813
See also
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In applying the Coffin "retention of rights" doctrine to prison inmates,
Palmigianoin effect utilized the rationale of the ninth amendment as it applies
to society at large.
Conclusion
Although the factual situation posed in Palmigiano would seem to limit its
application solely to pretrial inmates,"5 the court's reasoning is more widely

applicable since prison rules, procedures, and practices concerning mail
censorship apply equally to convicted and unconvicted inmates.
75. As in the factual context of Palmigiano, a large percentage of prison inmates in the United
States are unconvicted but are detained for want of bail. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 25 (1968).
As in Palmigiano, they are usually subject to the same mail censorship as their convicted brethren
and for essentially the same reasons. 317 F. Supp. at 78 1.
In Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D.M. 1968), the court found that an unconvicted
inmate had no more of a constitutional right to free access to the mails than a convicted prisoner.
"This is so because considerations of security of institutional administration and of rehabilitative
and medical practices are present to a large extent even though the particular inmate is an
unconvicted person." Id. at 810. Although some regulation is necessary due to the very fact of
confinement, the difference in prisoner status warrants different treatment particularly with respect
to the first and fourth amendments. See United States ex rel Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp.
683, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
In Tyler v. Ciccone, 299 F. Supp. 684 (W.D.M. 1969), the same court departed from Parks
and held that unconvicted persons charged with crime are entitled to the rights of free speech and
to do business accorded to all unconvicted citizens.
The challenged regulation, in its requirement that permission be obtained before allowing
preparation of the manuscript . . . and, in its provision for confiscation and censorship
• . . deprives the unconvicted inmate of fundamental constitutional rights and cannot
therefore be enforced against him.
Id. at 687.
The doctrine of judicial non-interference, the court ruled, was not applicable to an unconvicted
inmate since the courts retain the duty to protect all innocent persons against violations of statutory
and constitutional rights.
Although the court in Tyler recognized the threat against institutional security, the holding is
based primarily on the pretrial inmate's unrestricted right to privacy and in doing so, the court
negated the principle of balancing individual rights with social need. The by-product of such
reasoning is the negation of the government's maintenance of discipline and state interest argument.
317 F. Supp. at 793.
The reasoning of Tyler could logically expand to include the censoring of incoming mail. As
that procedure imposes on the rights of individuals to whom the inmate is corresponding, it violates
express first, fourth and ninth amendment guarantees as applied to nonprisoners. Such reasoning
gives birth to the principle that the censoring of incoming mail must be grounded on a state interest
more compelling than that applying to outgoing mail. Although the justifications of censorship
might be the same for both, the rights of the nonprisoner must be given greater weight than those
of the prison inmate.
The Palmigiano court referred only briefly to this distinction. 317 F. Supp. at 785. By adopting
the retention of rights doctrine enunciated in Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944),
the court plainly implied that its reasoning should also apply to convicted prisoners. Indeed, if
the reasoning of Palmigiano is so narrowly construed as to exclude the convicted prisoner, another
attempt at defining the constitutional rights in a prison context will be defeated.
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When carried to its logical conclusion, Palmigiano represents a step toward
free communication for the more than 300,000 prisoners in the United States.
However, if Palmigiano is limited solely to the unconvicted inmate, it must
be considered a retreat to that policy of avoidance known as the "hands-off"
doctrine. In any case, courts facing this issue might well utilize the fourth
amendment and consider the ninth amendment.
John E. Wehrum, Jr.
Owen C. Marx

